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Abstract
Events in the 1980s became the driving force behind state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) restructuring in the 1990s and beyond. In particular, the 1992 decision 
to seek listings for state-owned enterprises overseas had a tremendous impact 
on China's politics, economy and society. It may have been inevitable that the 
ﬁnancial surgery on state enterprises would have serious social consequences. 
The assumptions behind this effort to create national champions, however, 
also deﬁned the limitations on the Chinese government's response to the 
2008 global ﬁnancial crisis that broke out on the thirtieth anniversary of the 
'reform and opening' policy. While SOE reform may not be the single most 
important determinant of how China has developed, it has had a unique di-
rectional impact by implanting the core of the Western ﬁnancial system inside 
the Chinese state. This paper seeks to brieﬂy review the evolution of corpo-
rate reform and show how Western capitalism has made its broader impact. 
Keywords: SOE reform, national champion, shareholding, public listings, social security
Introduction
In 1978 China traded political revolution and social chaos for economic 
development under the slogan of 'reform and opening'. Here 'reform' 
suggested modernizing the country's economy while 'opening' referred 
to actively engaging the outside world in ways that would beneﬁt the 
country. These two policy aspects can be seen to come together in the 
policies encouraging China's state-owned enterprises (SOE) to absorb 
new technologies and skills from their foreign competitors, or 'partners', 
so as to increase production efﬁciency, product quality and ultimately, 
international competitiveness. Events in the long-forgotten 1980s com-
bined to be the driving force behind SOE restructuring in the 1990s. 
This effort had a tremendous and in many ways unexpected impact on 
the development of China's politics, economy and society. Moreover, 
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the approach taken to SOE reform largely deﬁned the limitations of the 
government's response to the global ﬁnancial crisis that broke out on the 
thirtieth anniversary of the reform and opening policy itself in December 
2008 (see Walter and Howie 2006: Chapter 9). While SOE reform may 
not be the single most important determinant of how China has changed 
over these 30 years, it has had a uniquely signiﬁcant directional impact. 
This paper seeks to brieﬂy review the evolution of corporate reforms 
over this period. By doing so it suggests just how important this path 
has been to bringing China to the year 2009 when the country faces 
perhaps its greatest challenge since determining how to move forward 
after the Cultural Revolution gasped to a close.
Why such a huge challenge now in 2009? It is not simply because there 
is a major ﬁnancial crisis. China has gone through major political, cur-
rency and market crises since 1978 and continued to move rapidly ahead 
economically. This time is different, however, since the crisis has seemed 
to discredit the ﬁnancial model China adopted to guide its reforms. While 
Deng enjoyed saying that China has gone from stone to stone to cross the 
river, those stones were not previously untrodden. What model? There is 
no doubt that—and all one has to do is look around China's rich coastal 
cities to see this—from the start China saw the American Superhighway 
to Capital as the fastest way to get rich; the Olympic Summer of 2008 
represented the very apogee of its adaptation of this model. Perhaps the 
sixtieth anniversary military parade represents its new direction.
On this highway China has passed through four stages on its route 
to American capitalism Chinese-style. Figure 1 suggests how China has 
largely pursued reform and opening in line with the American path 
toward ﬁnancial deregulation. It may feel strange for those who work 
in China and struggle each day with the Chinese regulatory system to 
consider that the government has deregulated its markets. Nonetheless, 
there can be no doubt that on a relative basis China has a far more liberal 
and open economic system than it began with in 1978. At that time there 
was no banking system, no stock markets, no private (non-state) sector 
and very few foreigners struggling against anything. 
Stage 1: 1978-1992
In Stage 1, roughly the years from 1978 to 1991, the reform and opening 
policy came to focus on state-owned enterprises (see Wu Jinglian 2003: 
Chapters 2 and 8) and the creation of special economic development 
zones (SEZ) where joint ventures (JV) between SOEs and foreign com-
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panies could be established (see Lardy 1992; Huang 2003). In 1980, four 
coastal cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong and Xiamen 
in Fujian) were designated SEZs and special policies were enacted to 
attract foreign investment; in 1984, this so-called 'open-door policy' was 
extended to 14 coastal cities including Dalian, Qinghuangdao,Tianjin, 
Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang (Liaoning), Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjianj (Guangdong) and Beihai. 
From 1988 Hainan Province was designated an SEZ while the original 
four had their areas enlarged, creating vast open spaces in the Yangtze 
and Pearl River Deltas, Fujian and the Shandong and Liaodong Penin-
sulas. Finally, the Shanghai Pudong New Area was approved in 1990 to 
become the 'Dragon's Head' of the Yangtze River valley. This more or 
less marked the end of laying out special areas for foreign investment; 
the entire country was thrown open to it during the 1990s.
The objective of this massive opening, at least at the outset, was to 
beneﬁt the SOEs. It was thought that these enterprises, through the ab-
sorption of new technologies and skills from their foreign competitors, 
that is to say, JV partners, would become more efﬁcient and competitive. 
The famous Beijing Jeep joint venture of the mid-1980s was the largest 
of these and might be taken as an emblem of the various difﬁculties 
associated with this effort. Here the Chinese side typically contributed 
land, buildings and equipment as its capital contribution to the JV 
while the foreign partner brought in money, equipment and modern 
technologies (Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 1: Thirty Years of Reform: Trends in Deregulation
Source: Based on Peter Nolan, comments, Copenhagen Business School, 4 December 2008.
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The problem with JVs has always been summed up by the famous say-
ing 'same bed, different dreams'. In short, although some have worked 
out, these corporate forms are not the most desirable and effective for 
either side. JVs created friction between the partners, hampering the 
hoped-for transfer of experience and technology and making proﬁt-
ability an elusive goal. Even worse, it was not a particularly effective 
way to draw foreign investment: through 1992 only US$20 billion had 
been committed. But even though the JV was not a successful structure, 
it was the opening of the SEZs themselves that has had long-lasting 
consequences that would only become clear in the new century.
A second effort toward SOE reform was also begun in late 1978 in 
Sichuan. There the provincial government, led by future party secretary 
Zhao Ziyang, launched a pilot project to expand management autonomy 
in six selected enterprises (Wu Jinglian 2003: 138-39). These six SOEs 
contracted to produce a certain amount of goods according to the state 
plan; any production beyond that could be sold by the SOE with these 
revenues accruing to it alone. These funds would, theoretically, then 
be used to acquire advanced technologies to upgrade the SOE's capa-
bilities or incentivize workers and staff by increasing compensation 
(Figure 3).
In July 1979 the State Council deemed this initial trial a success 
and ordered it expanded across the country; by year-end some 4,200 
provincial-level enterprises were involved. Then, in 1980, some 6,600 
large- and medium-sized SOEs, accounting for 60 percent of national 
FIGURE 2: Sino-Foreign Joint Venture
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industrial output and 70 percent of national industrial proﬁt, joined 
the reform program (Wu Jinglian 2004). Over the course of the 1980s 
the autonomy of these enterprises grew stronger and relations with the 
government increasingly became based on contracts rather than plans. 
This overall program became known as the contract responsibility sys-
tem. In contrast to the JV initiative, the SOE remained as it was; there 
was only a transactional trading relationship with the foreign party if 
any existed at all. 
This reform had signiﬁcant and far-reaching consequences. By es-
tablishing an enterprise's legal rights to certain monies and the assets 
acquired with them, the balance of power between the state and senior 
enterprise management began to shift in favor of the latter. As one SOE 
boss said, 'It doesn't matter who the money belongs to, it matters who 
gets to use it!' The SOEs operating under the contract responsibility 
system can be seen as the harbingers of the huge business groups that 
gained tremendous political inﬂuence later in the 1990s. Beijing's Capital 
Iron & Steel and its famous chairman, Zhou Guanwu, were perhaps the 
most famous representatives of this line of reform. It was not surprising 
that Zhou and his son, Zhou Dongfang, were beaten down by the central 
government in the early 1990s when the latter still retained the upper 
hand against its own enterprises. This was a tragedy of epic proportion 
as the true founder of that huge enterprise on Beijing's western edge was 
forced into retirement, his son thrown in jail and the enterprise itself, a 
steel maker producing ten million tons a year, was driven out of town 
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FIGURE 3: SOEs Operating under Contract Responsibility System
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to enable Beijing to claim a 'green' Olympics in 2008 (see Nolan 2001: 
Part 1 for many more such stories). How times change.
These, then, were the two mainstream corporate reform efforts of the 
1980s. There was, however, a third experience that developed tremen-
dous momentum during the decade: small enterprises issuing shares 
(or something like them; see Figure 4). On 3 July 1979, the State Council 
gave the initial go-ahead for what was already a spontaneous practice 
saying, 'It is permitted to take an appropriate amount of funds from the 
brigade or production group's common accumulated funds to put in as 
(start-up) equity (gu)' (Wu Xiaoling 2008: 18). This unheralded sentence 
kicked off an experiment deep in the countryside on the extreme fringe 
of the economy that over the past 30 years has became one of the two 
principal driving forces creating the China of 2008.
From 1978 to 1983, the number of what became known as 'collective 
stock enterprises' (gufen hezuo qiye) grew (Liu Hongru 2008: vol. 1: 156). 
The early pioneers included such standouts as the Liaoning Fushun 
No. 1 Red Brick Factory, Shanghai Feile Acoustics, the Chengdu Shudu 
Building, the Shenzhen Baoan Joint Stock Investment Company and 
the Beijing Tianqiao Department Store—each a pretender to the claim 
of being the ﬁrst to issue shares. The Communist Party's famous 1984 
'Decision on the Reform of the Economic System' provided the ofﬁcial 
imprimatur for this development and by late 1986 the number of such 
enterprises had reached 6,000 to 7,000 nationwide, raising altogether 
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FIGURE 4: Collective Stock Enterprise
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around RMB6 billion (Liu Hongru 1992), at the time a lot of money and 
all outside of any state plan. The central government had all along indi-
cated, at times obliquely, its general support of this capitalist practice. 
This positive attitude was perhaps best symbolized by Deng Xiaoping's 
meeting with the Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange in the 
Great Hall of the People in November 1986.
If things had simply remained at a local level and involved only small 
enterprises raising small money there would be no story. But someone 
started to think big and in 1986 the Shenzhen government, with a bow 
to Hong Kong, produced the ﬁrst regulations standardizing the process 
by which enterprises could be reorganized as shareholding companies 
(Jiang Ping 1997: vol. 2,  2815-18). The 1986 Shenzhen Provisions repre-
sent the ﬁrst effort to systematize and standardize procedures relating 
to the restructuring of enterprises into shareholding companies. One 
wonders what the balance sheets looked like in the share-issuing enter-
prises prior to 1986 (for a look, see Walter and Howie 2006: 69-73).
The main characteristic of these provisions was their liberalism. Al-
though they were directed primarily at the restructuring of the Shen-
zhen's own SOEs, the government welcomed all enterprises to use them 
as a guide. In addition to other domestic enterprises and individuals, 
foreign investors were also permitted to acquire shares in restructured 
SOEs by buying either existing shares from the government or newly 
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FIGURE 5: Creation of a Company Limited by Shares
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issued shares (see Figure 5). Restructured SOEs were permitted to sell 
shares overseas and banks could hold shares as either loan collateral 
or as part of a debt-for-equity swap. Ownership of shares was closely 
deﬁned and permitted the holder to sell, gift, inherit or use as loan 
collateral. Obviously inﬂuenced by Hong Kong laws, the Shenzhen 
Provisions suggest a possible outcome different from that adopted 
by the State Council following the Tiananmen incident. Even today, 
China's securities regulations have been unable to attain this level of 
sophistication.
What happened next when these provisions were applied can be 
clearly seen in the ﬁve types of companies that used them: 1) small SOEs 
soliciting investment from the state, other enterprises and individu-
als; 2) large SOEs that incorporated with a single state shareholder; 3) 
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures restructuring as shareholding companies; 
4) private companies; and 5) limited liability companies with multiple 
shareholders. All these companies underwent restructuring into share-
holding companies only with the aim of raising money. Their actions 
were not driven by political need, only economics. The result of such 
capital raising in Shenzhen verged on outright privatization, as Table 
1 illustrates. 
TABLE 1: Shareholding Structure, National vs. Shenzhen (31 December 
1991)
Shareholder National Sample
State  
per-
cent
Shenzhen Sample
State  
per-
cent
State 47 76 23 36
Enterprise 29 13
Individual 14 27
Foreigner 9 37
Source: Liu Hongru 1992; Gao and Ye 1991: 88.
Shenzhen was not isolated in its enthusiasm for this policy direction. 
Local governments across China at this time were actually sending in 
surveys of SOE bosses indicating, as might be expected, overwhelming 
support for the reform (Li Zhangzhe 2001: 113 ff). At this same time the 
State Committee for Restructuring the Economic System (SCRES) had 
prepared and sent to the State Council a draft regulation titled 'Pilot 
Method for Enterprises Carrying out the Shareholding System'. It was 
well received, but events of 1989 swept past it.
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Simultaneous with all this activity in the capital, in March 1989 the 
Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB), the ﬁrst large state-owned enter-
prise to offer shares to the public in 1987, announced its ﬁrst dividend. 
This single act changed China's post-revolution ﬁnancial landscape 
forever. The bank's shareholders (mostly the government, so the motive 
for this dividend is clear) received a fat cash dividend as well as a two-
for-one stock dividend. In the blink of an eye, all investors, including 
the moms and pops, enjoyed a proﬁt several times their original invest-
ment. This was wonderful, but it was the negligence of a small number 
of shareholders who had failed to claim their new shares that changed 
everything. The bank had no choice but to auction these remnants off 
publicly. In an instant one individual appeared and bought the whole 
lot at several times the asked price. This news spread throughout Shen-
zhen like wildﬁre and armed with this new insight—shares were dif-
ferent than bonds!—investors set off a period of 'share fever' centred on 
Shenzhen and extending during 1990 (and despite June 4) to Shanghai 
(Cao Erjie 1994: 140 ff). 
Stage 2: 1992-1998
The popular enthusiasm for the quick buck and attendant alleged 'social 
unrest' in the post-June 4 environment gave the conservative wing of 
the government the opening to develop regulatory controls in a bid to 
impose order. In May 1990 the State Council announced restrictions on 
the experiment (Liu Hongru 2003: 48-49; Walter and Howie 2006: 27-28; 
Li Zhangzhe 1997: 128-29). Of these there were two pivotal ones. First, 
the state hijacked the entire shareholding experiment: going forward 
only SOEs could experiment with share issuance. This decision was the 
deﬁning moment in the development of China's capital markets revers-
ing as it did the entire experience of the freewheeling 1980s. Henceforth, 
the story of China's experience with stock exchanges would not be about 
privatization and capital allocation, but rather ﬁnancing troubled SOEs, 
moral hazard, corruption and speculation, lots of speculation (Yuan 
Jian 2004: 1-6). Second, Shenzhen and Shanghai were designated as the 
only ofﬁcially recognized OTC trading markets, thereby excluding ac-
tive exchanges in Shenyang, Chengdu, Wuhan, Beijing and Tianjin, all 
of which were gradually closed down.
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Hijacking the Shareholding System
Despite these restrictions, or perhaps because the experiment was now 
brought wholly within the bounds of the state system, the effort moved 
ahead. A decision was made at the same time to proceed with the for-
mal establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges. 
Taken during the wild market conditions in the ﬁrst half of 1990, the 
intent was to eliminate street markets and crowds by providing a con-
trolled venue for securities trading in two administrative areas at the 
time well under the thumb of the central government. The prospect of 
having potentially disruptive securities exchanges located throughout 
the country, much less in Beijing, was politically unacceptable in the 
post-Tiananmen period. In the event, the Shanghai exchange opened in 
December 1990 and Shenzhen shortly after, in July 1991. But in both cases 
only the few companies that had publicly sold shares and a handful of 
government bond issues were listed and there were no plans to add to 
them. The exchanges were thus stillborn and the wild street scenes of 
the preceding years disappeared. This did not last long.
In early 1992 Deng Xiaoping took his now famous Chinese New Year 
trip, the so-called Southern Journey, to the SEZs in Guangdong. His com-
ments made at various stops ended the political stasis that had frozen 
China in place since June 1989 and appeared to set free the innovative 
forces characterizing the 1980s. And change did move forward rapidly. 
Many commented that 1992 marked a return to Zhao Ziyang's policies 
of super-fast growth, but without Zhao, of course. It soon became clear, 
however, that in the 1990s capital markets change was going to be all 
about the state industrial sector. Moreover, it was not going to be about 
Western-style privatization, but about ﬁnancing troubled SOEs and, 
as a side result, strengthening those who controlled them (Liu Hongru 
2003: 51-54). It has only become clear now, more than 15 years later and 
against the backdrop of the purported 'collapse' of Anglo-Saxon-style 
ﬁnancial capitalism, just how deeply this path has imperiled China and 
its much spoken of 'transition'. How did this happen?
Ownership in a Communist State
It happened because the shareholding reforms opened up the Pando-
ra's box of 'ownership' (Cao Lan 2001: 16). Under the socialist planned 
economy, SOEs were held by the state on behalf of the 'whole people'. 
There were no clear ownership rights to SOEs (or anything else for 
that matter) under such a deliberately nebulous ideological proposi-
tion. When SOEs entered into JVs with foreign companies, explicit 
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and legally binding ownership rights in the JV were created, but these 
rights were not fungible, they could not be easily transferred and sold 
and, moreover, the ownership of the SOE itself remained unaffected. 
Similarly, the contract responsibility system did nothing to change the 
structure of the SOE. It did, however, advance developments toward 
deﬁning ownership in one very important way. The sale of product 
over and above the plan quota gave the SOE its own capital to invest 
as it desired outside the plan. 
The value of this right became clear after China's ﬁrst corporate law, 
the 'Standard Opinion', went into effect in 1992. Under the Opinion, 
companies limited by shares were created when a promoter contributed 
assets to the establishment of the NewCo and received share certiﬁcates 
in return (see Figure 6). The question became: who owned the assets 
contributed and, therefore, the shares? Thus was the lid to Pandora's 
box opened. Obviously, the state had invested in the establishment and 
development of the SOEs and owned them lock, stock and barrel. But, 
due to the contract responsibility system, some SOEs now also had their 
'own' capital and assets. Of course, all was ultimately owned by the state, 
but it was a matter of what part of the state or just how directly. As time 
went on, what might have been seen as a quibble at the start became 
the mighty wedge that would undermine the government at all levels 
by creating the very foundation for pervasive corruption. 
Assuming that the SOE contributed assets acquired with its own 
earnings, a NewCo, at its inception, could have at least two share-
holders. From this point, the resulting multiplicity of owners (and 
the consequent differences in self-interest) began to confuse the very 
notion of the 'state'. But what was the point of creating NewCo and 
this confusion in the ﬁrst place? The answer is straightforward and 
the same in all places in the world: an unquenchable thirst for capital. 
Local governments in the 1980s (as today) had extremely limited ﬁ-
nancing resources. Somehow the idea of stocks and stock markets had 
taken hold in the relaxed political environment following the Cultural 
Revolution. By 1988 these innovations were about to be memorialized 
by government laws and regulations and even in the institution of 
a stock exchange. Zhu Rongji, then the mayor of Shanghai, was the 
great proponent of stock markets (Li Zhangzhe 2001: 130 ff; Wang 
An 2000: 82-83). But stock markets without stock cannot exist, so cor-
poratizing SOE assets was the requisite pre-condition to listing. The 
consequences of what was seen by the government as a technical detail 
to a straightforward ﬁnancing transaction (no need to repay equity!) 
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was, however, not foreseen, nor were the many beneﬁciaries desirous 
of having it foreseen!
The process of corporatization took the formally non-fungible assets 
(you couldn't readily swap a piece of machinery for cash) of the SOE, 
clariﬁed their ownership, i.e., who paid for them originally, and in the 
ﬁrst step issued very marketable share certiﬁcates in return to the con-
tributors (or 'promoters' of NewCo). Legally deﬁned ownership title 
had thus been created where before there had been none. As the SOE 
boss said, 'It doesn't matter ....'
Internationalizing the Shareholding Experiment
By itself all this might have been manageable if listing had taken place 
only on the domestic exchanges. It was the decision made in April 
1992, once again by Zhu Rongji, now Vice-Premier, to list ten Chinese 
NewCos on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) that led to truly 
signiﬁcant change: the rules of the game became foreign rules not Chi-
nese rules (Liu Hongru 2008: 672). Of course, at this time the ability to 
have the 'face' gained by listing in Hong Kong or even New York, if 
possible, became the ultimate objective for all the major SOEs and their 
bosses. It is hard now to imagine the chaotic struggle that resulted to 
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FIGURE 6: The Company Limited by Shares
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achieve this privilege; meanwhile the domestic markets were relegated 
to smaller, less politically connected enterprises (see Walter and Howie 
2001: Appendix 25 for the list of connected candidates). But the foreign 
rules were, not unexpectedly, about value: what did investors get for 
their capital?
Listing shares on any stock exchange required companies to have 
their capital expressed in terms of numbers of shares of a certain value 
per share. This value as offered to third party investors is a function 
of the company's expected future proﬁt growth potential. This was not 
so when listing on China's domestic exchanges; the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) provided a formula based on earnings 
history and the one formula ﬁt all companies. In short, the Chinese ap-
proach treated companies as commodities. But when it came to listing 
overseas, investment bankers required that a company have a positive 
earnings outlook for the next three years based on internationally ac-
cepted standards of valuation. The typical SOE had no such earnings 
proﬁle. This was the rub: the SOEs listing domestically did not have to 
undergo a top-to-bottom restructuring in pursuit of a proﬁtable core, 
but those listing internationally did (Figure 7). International investors, in 
short, had absolutely no interest in investing in Chinese social security 
arrangements.
Such a restructuring split the SOE into two basic pieces, the largest of 
which was naturally the old SOE portion. This piece now became known 
as the Group Company and included all non-operating assets, retirees 
FIGURE 7: SOE Corporatization for International Listing
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and their families and all peripheral social entities (for example, ﬁre and 
police, courts, travel agencies, hotels, restaurants), plus all unproﬁtable 
operating assets. This part, in effect, was the state social security system. 
The smaller part was the proposed NewCo. This comprised all the pro-
ductive assets, labour, technologies, brands and so forth. Presumably 
this portion, modelled after similar already-listed companies in market 
economies, would be increasingly proﬁtable. This type of restructuring 
is really a triumph of accounting, legal and tax advice and investment 
bank modelling and valuation. It was also a social disaster. Nevertheless, 
in 1994, with the signing of the Company Law (again by Zhu Rongji), the 
Chinese government indicated that corporatization and shareholding 
reforms would be the principal way forward for the SOEs.
Social Welfare and Other Consequences
It was a social disaster because, in the absence of anything else, it de-
stroyed the SOE's core function as the provider of social security to the 
Chinese worker and his family. If the foundation of the Chinese state 
was social stability, the SOE was its cornerstone. From 1997, investment 
bankers began to chip away at this stone by using their ﬁnancial magic on 
entire industries and out of their efforts arose China's national champi-
ons starting with the US$4.1 billion IPO for China Telecom (now known 
as China Mobile; see Table 2). This success, plus the soon-to-break-out 
Holding Co. Ltd.
Parent companies
New company
Ministry
FIGURE 8: Industry Restructuring into a Single NewCo
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Asian ﬁnancial crisis, further exacerbated the social problem: millions 
of workers were laid off and retirees suddenly left without sufﬁcient 
pensions. Simply put, the cash ﬂow of the newly listed company was 
now legally its property alone as a result of incorporation. The SOE 
parent became simply one of now many investors receiving dividend 
payouts, but these were insufﬁcient to meet the social obligations of its 
greater enterprise.
 The economic forces set loose by Western-style corporate restructur-
ing led to signiﬁcant consequences for China's government. First, in 
order to take care of jobless former state employees, the government had 
little choice but to begin experimenting with social security and medical 
Source: Wind Information.
TABLE 2: National Champion Overseas IPOs, 1997-2005
Company Industry Date
IPO Size (in 
billions of 
US$)
China Mobile Telecoms/mobile 23 Oct. 1997 4.1 
PetroChina Oil and gas 7 July 2000 2.9 
China Unicom Telecoms/mobile 22 June 2000 5.1 
Sinopec Oil and gas 19 Oct. 2000 3.3 
China National Off-
shore Oil
Oil and gas 28 Feb. 2001 1.4 
China Aluminum Mining and processing 12 Dec. 2001 0.5 
China Telecom Telecoms/ﬁxed line 8 Nov. 2002 1.4 
China Life Insurance Insurance 18 Dec. 2003 3.4 
Ping An Insurance Insurance 24 June 2004 1.8 
Air China Airlines 15 June 2005 1.2 
China Shenhua 
Energy
Energy and 
Power
15 June 2005 3.3 
Bank of Communica-
tions
Banking 23 June 2005 2.2 
China Construction 
Bank
Banking 27 Oct. 2005 9.2 
Bank of China Banking 1 June 2006 11.1 
Total Capital Raised 50.9 
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insurance solutions (Xiang Huaicheng 2005). Second, to create the jobs 
that the state sector could not and to provide an interim social security 
net, the government, and especially the local governments, encouraged 
even more foreign investment. Third, the creation of industry-wide 
monopolistic companies, known as the national champions, created 
monopolistic economic power that came to threaten, if not supplant, 
the state itself. The rest of this paper describes how these special inter-
est groups created by Western-style capital markets clashed with the 
government over the issue of funding social security. 
Stage 3: 1998-2002
Reforms of SOE Ownership and the Central Bureaucracy
Over the course of the 1990s local enterprises, workers, mom and pop 
investors and local governments had seen their inﬂuence diminished 
and ultimately usurped by central government agencies, central state 
enterprises (the yangqi) and the ﬁnancial sector, also largely owned by 
Beijing. With this decline in inﬂuence went a vast decrease in ﬁnancial 
capacity at the local level. Although the 1994 tax reforms clariﬁed those 
taxes that would be collected and kept by local governments, the 1998 
collapse of Guangdong International Trust and Development Corpora-
tion (GITIC), led to the closure of all but 50 of the 400 trust companies 
owned by local governments (Li and Cao 2007: 443-79). These non-bank 
ﬁnancial institutions had allowed localities to raise signiﬁcant debt capi-
tal outside their approved budgets which, by law, were required to be 
balanced. This decline in extra-budgetary ﬁnancial resources, combined 
with the impact of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, inevitably beneﬁted the 
foreign-invested sector as local governments were driven to compete 
even more strongly for new foreign investment and consequent job 
creation and tax revenues.
The Asia ﬁnancial crisis also compelled Premier Zhu Rongji to stream-
line the bloated central government bureaucracy. Despite strong resist-
ance, Zhu succeeded in reducing the number of ministries from 41 to 29, 
downsizing the State Council from 32,000 to 16,000 staff and eliminating 
a number of industrial ministries as well as the agency overseeing the 
management of state assets. The ﬂip-side of this was the support he 
received from SOE groups which, with fewer and weaker 'grandmoth-
ers' overlooking their activities, now truly emerged as virtual kingdoms 
unto themselves. Their political inﬂuence grew in line with their ﬁnancial 
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wealth. How could it be any different when the related senior ministry 
ofﬁcials had parachuted into top positions of these groups; who knew 
the hot buttons of government better than they?
As illustrated by Figure 9, the State Asset Management Bureau 
(SAMB), an early forerunner of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC)  and the agency of the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) responsible for the oversight of SOEs, was eliminated 
in this restructuring. For the next ﬁve years all major decisions relating 
to ownership issues in the industrial sector owned by the central gov-
ernment were handled by a poorly manned ofﬁce, the MOF Enterprise 
Ofﬁce (qiye si). With this bureau and most industrial ministries gone, 
many SOEs became virtually autonomous with only the Party apparatus 
left to oversee them.
Social Security
Thus the pressure to build a viable social security system was driven 
by the form of corporate restructuring adopted by China as well as by 
the domestic impact of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (Garnaut et al. 2005: 
Chapter 4). Discussed since 1995, but put into effect in 1998, the 'seize 
the large, release the small' policy towards SOEs quickened the layoff of 
workers in the local SOE sector. Henceforth only the 500 largest SOEs, 
for the most part owned by the central government, would receive state 
support. The cash-strapped provincial and local governments, for their 
part, were forced to spin off their smaller SOEs into private hands in 
the hope that jobs would be retained if not increased. 
But, obviously, a sound social security system is not simply a mat-
ter relevant to former SOE employees. China's population is rapidly 
aging. As Table 3 indicates, by the middle of the twenty-ﬁrst century 
FIGURE 9: Ownership Arrangements of State-owned Enterprises
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FIGURE 10: Committed Foreign Direct Investment, 1979-2007 (US$ 
billion)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various.
some 300 million people will be over 65. This is a vast underestimate 
of those needing some form of government support as state workers 
are required to retire at 55 for men and 50 for women. Without SOEs, 
what would support them? 
TABLE 3: China's Aging Population
Population (in 
billions)
0-14 years 15-64 years 65+ years
1995 1.21 327 808 76
2000 1.26 328 845 87
2010 1.35 293 956 104
2020 1.43 287 989 214
2030 1.48 278 989 214
2040 1.49 287 950 252
2050 1.47 211 962 300
Source: World Bank, Asia Wall Street Journal, 15-17 June 2001, p. M1.
2nd liberalization1st liberalization
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Foreign Investment
Second, and in retrospect fraught with risk, the government had little 
choice but to increase its dependence on the non-state sector to create 
jobs. While minying, or enterprises managed by the people, were actively 
encouraged, foreign investment rules were liberalized for the second time 
since 2001 (the ﬁrst great liberalization following the Tiananmen incident) 
as China negotiated its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and capital began to pour in once again (see Figure 10) (Lardy 1992: 75-
77; Fung et al. 2002). Just how important FDI became can be seen in the 
employment data (see Figure 11). 
Through the end of 2003 the state-owned sector had shed nearly 44 
million jobs while the private and foreign-invested sectors together had 
added over 52 million. But a look at the type of foreign investment vehicle 
might better illustrate the country's eagerness for foreign investment (see 
Table 4). As foreign investment began in the 1980s the dominant form of 
investment vehicle was, as discussed above, the Sino-foreign joint ven-
ture (JV). The type of JV is not important to this analysis, it was enough 
that it was a JV and that it was relatively difﬁcult for foreign investors to 
establish wholly-owned companies in China until the late 1990s. As of 
2000 wholly-foreign owned enterprises (WOFE) represented 47 percent 
of total FDI investment value and 54 percent of the number of all projects 
approved. Eight years later, in 2008, WOFEs constituted 78 percent of 
total FDI and 81 percent of all approved projects (see Table 4).
FIGURE 11: Employment Trends SOEs vs. Private and Foreign Sectors, 
1989-2003 (in thousands)
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Reliance on foreign companies to create employment opportunities 
while the state sector shrank was not the only risk created by China's 
FDI policies. The aggressive attraction of foreign investment also raised 
the country's exposure to the international trading system to levels 
exceptional within the global context. One indicator of an economy's 
involvement with the international economy showed that China was 
TABLE 4: FDI by Investment Vehicle Structure 
 
EJV
(in %)
CJV
 (in %)
WFOE
(in %)
FISE
(in %)
Total FDI 
(in billions of US$)
2000 36.2 16.1 47.4 0.2 40.3
2001 35.1 13.1 50.9 0.9 46.4
2002 28.4 9.7 60.5 1.3 52.4
2003 29.1 7.2 63.1 0.6 52.9
2004 27.1 5.1 66.4 1.3 60.5
2005 24.2 3 71.4 1.4 60.3
2006 22.5 4 73.4 0.6 65.8
2007 20.9 1.9 76.6 0.7 74.8
2008 18.7 2.1 78.2 1.0 92.4
Source: US-China Business Council, www.uschina.org, 9 August, 2009.
Note: EJV – Equity JV; CJV – Contractual JV; WFOE – Wholly-owned foreign enterprise; FISE 
– Foreign-invested shareholding enterprise
TABLE 5: Comparative Foreign Trade Ratios, 2006
Country Trade Ratio Country Trade Ratio
China 67 United States 23
Denmark 65 Russia 48
Finland 69 India 32
Israel 69 Japan 28
Korea 72 Brazil 22
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008.
more open and more exposed than any large economy in the world 
(see Table 5) (Lardy 1992: 150-55). Thus, the obverse side to investment 
and job creation was the development of this double-edged political 
risk—domestic reliance on foreign investment and economic reliance 
on foreign trade—that was not perceived until it was far too late.
Stage 4: 2002-2008
As the government considered how to fund a national social security 
scheme in the late 1990s, it found that the shareholding system, the 
cause of the problem, also offered a potential solution (Yuan Jian 2004: 
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198-202; 253-68). From the start, the SOE listing process had only been 
about raising capital, not privatization or better corporate governance. 
To drive that point home, a regulation made clear that the dilution of 
the state's holdings below 51 percent was forbidden. Consequently, at 
the start of the new century the state still held on average 66 percent 
of the shares of all domestically listed companies. It could, simply by 
selling some of these shares, raise signiﬁcant sums of money, while still 
retaining absolute control of its SOEs.
Old Shares for New
Until 2001 the funding received from IPOs or share placements had come 
only from selling new shares, not old ones. The consequences of this were 
twofold: ﬁrst, the proceeds of the IPO were retained directly by the is-
suer itself and could be used for corporate development. This was what 
investors wanted to see and was good. The second consequence was more 
ideological: the state would not be perceived as even suggesting that it 
would privatize its companies by directly selling down even a portion 
of its holdings. This was also good as it was the fundamental condition 
(along with the 51 percent rule) of proceeding. But that was before. Now 
conditions had changed and it was 2001. If the state could ﬁnd a way 
around its ideological concerns to sell some of its existing shares as part 
of an IPO, then such proceeds could go to the state investor and not to 
the increasingly autonomous company management team and could be 
used as the state itself saw ﬁt (Walter and Howie 2006: 207-09). These 
monies, then, could be directed to fund social security.
The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) was established in late 
2001 to provide a funding source of last resort for locally sponsored 
social security schemes. Its principal sources of funding (see Table 6) 
were meant to be from the National Budget via the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), the various national lotteries and, based on the CSRC proposal 
described below, proceeds from the outright sale of state-owned shares. 
The CSRC proposed that a modest 10 percent of all shares sold in IPOs 
or share placements be existing shares, not new shares, and that the 
proceeds be deposited directly in the accounts of the NSSF (see Figure 
12). The timing of this proposal appeared to be perfect: the Shanghai 
Index had just hit an historic high of 2,000 points. But when the ﬁrst 
IPOs under the new policy took place, the market immediately col-
lapsed (see Figure 13). Over the next four years the securities industry 
went bankrupt and the state was forced to make good the investments 
of small retail investors at huge cost. The approach was abandoned just 
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TABLE 6: Trends in NSSF Funding Sources, 2000 - 2007
(RMB in 
billions)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
MOF 20.0 47.4 30.4 - 17.1 10.0 38.6 10.0 173.5
Sale of State 
Shares
- 12.2 8.8 0.4 4.7 8.3 11.4 12.5* 48.3
Lottery - - 2.4 4.5 6.1 4.6 7.4 8.3 33.3
Total 20.0 59.5 41.6 4.9 27.9 22.9 57.4 30.8 255.1
Source: NSSF, Annual Reports 2000-2007, at www.ssf.gov.cn, various dates
Note: includes only RMB4.4 billion derived from listings or secondary offerings and, for the ﬁrst 
time, RMB8.1 billion came from the over-the-counter transfer of state shares.
months after it was announced (except for listings and placements in 
the international market). How did this modest and well-intentioned 
policy fail with such disastrous results?
The Powers of Dilution
First of all, domestic investors believed that the state would never 
privatize, that is, sell down its existing shares held in its companies 
(something the government had repeated over and again). Of course, 
if state-owned shares began to be sold into the market, the potential for 
signiﬁcant dilution of listed share values existed. Based, however, on 
Border
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26.5%
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FIGURE 12: State Sells Ten Percent of Total Shares Offered in IPO
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.
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the understanding that such shares would remain unlisted, the market, 
the listed companies and investors simply came to ignore the huge 66 
percent overhang of unlisted shares during the 1990s. As a consequence, 
a sort of informal social contract had been created. This, at least, was 
the argument that the interest groups used to ultimately prevent the 
government from diluting the value of their holdings. And how did 
these business groups arise? The stock markets had created them.
The markets had created the wealth and enhanced the political clout 
of the huge nearly autonomous national champions. The ministries or 
group companies that 'owned' the great listed companies did not sup-
port the idea that the shares they held, theoretically on behalf of the 
state, could be sold at the order of the state (e.g., the 2 percent sold by 
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Ministry X in Figure 12). And if these shares were sold, they liked still 
less the fact that the proceeds would accrue not to themselves, but to 
another state entity, to wit, the NSSF. And to make this worse, the ad-
dition to the market of potentially huge volumes of such state shares 
would devalue their own companies' market capitalization as well as the 
stock positions their companies, or their subsidiaries, for example, the 
securities companies, might be holding (not to mention their personal 
holdings). These were the motivations behind their effort to put a halt 
to the CSRC's policy (Hu Shuli 2002: 6).
The Consequences of Failed Welfare Reform
Now, in 2008 and 2009, and after 30 years of 'reform and opening,' the 
absence of a viable national social security scheme has made itself felt 
as millions of workers in the foreign-invested, internationally exposed 
areas of the economy are being laid off due to the global recession. The 
ability of the oligarchic national champions to assert their own economic 
interests ahead of the national interest can be seen in the events of 2001. 
The Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao government took ofﬁce in 2003 explicitly 
seeking to rebalance the emphasis of economic development away 
from such groups. For example, in 2003 the SASAC was established 
to ﬁll the void left by the elimination of the SAMB (Walter and Howie 
2006: 219-22). But to date, SASAC has also been unable to assert itself. 
It has proven, for example, nearly impossible to access dividends paid 
by the investments it is entrusted by the State Council to manage! The 
struggle goes on.
Looking Ahead
The global crisis has further weakened the central government's hand 
against the interest groups: the economic stimulus package of unlimited 
loans plays directly into their hands. Moreover, despite efforts at control-
ling medical costs and relieving the burdens of farmers, Olympic hubris 
and the ﬁnancial crisis are creating a cynical urban populace. This can be 
seen in their reaction to the burning of the CCTV Tower hotel building. 
Nor is it any secret who all the high-end shopping malls have been (and 
are being) built for. Despite the overwhelming power of China's sixtieth 
anniversary celebrations, bread and circuses may no longer be a viable 
option to build social unity: real economic growth and jobs are needed. 
At a time when the glow of the wildly successful Beijing Olympics has 
barely faded, a political struggle has broken out between, on the one 
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hand, those who most beneﬁted from the old outward looking regime 
and seek its continuation—it did produce growth—and, on the other, 
those who seek a more inwardly oriented socialist path. 
Will there be a restoration of a far more statist political economy with 
American-style market forces suppressed or, more of what has been 
the case to date, a Wild West scenario where business groups are able 
to trump the government and money continues to be the be-all and 
end-all. American proﬂigacy, after all, did greatly contribute to China's 
present wealth. Looking forward it is unclear what direction China 
will take in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis. Without question, 
on the thirty-year anniversary of reform and opening, China is facing 
its greatest challenge since emerging from the Cultural Revolution in 
1976 and successfully groping across the stones to ﬁnd its way forward 
toward today. 
Carl E. Walter is an investment banker living and working in Beijing. He 
holds a PhD from Stanford University and a graduate certiﬁcate from Beijing 
University.(carl.walter@jpmorgan.com)
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